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STRAY KATZ: IS SHREDDED TRASH PRIVATE?
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of several weeks during the summer of 1989, a
West Roxbury, Massachusetts bookkeeper, Alan N. Scott, shredded
documents into strips of 5/32ds of an inch and placed them with his
garbage on the curb directly in front of his house.' The Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) suspected Scott, who previously had been con-
victed of filing false claims against the government, of filing false
electronic tax returns.2 An IRS Special Agent, posing as a trash collec-
tor, picked up Scott's garbage. 3 IRS agents then "painstakingly recon-
structed"4 the documents. The reconstructed documents, along with
others seized pursuant to a warrant that the agents later obtained,
constituted virtually all of the evidence linking Scott to names, ad-
dresses and bank accounts allegedly used in a tax fraud scheme. 5
A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Scott with
forty-seven counts of false internal revenue claims. 6 At trial, Scott
moved to suppress all documents seized in both the warrantless search
of his trash and the search of his home, as the fruits of those searches,
arguing that the IRS had violated the Fourth Amendment.7 The dis-
trict court granted that motion, holding that the search was unconsti-
tutional because it breached Alan Scott's reasonable expectations of
privacy.8 On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit reversed. The court found that the seizure was consistent with
Fourth Amendment requirements. 9 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 10
Whether law enforcement authorities may, without a warrant and
consistent with the Fourth Amendment,' pick through garbage left
1 Brief for Appellant, the United States of America at 2, 4, United States v. Scott, 975
F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
2 Id. at 3-4.
3 United States v. Scott, 776 F. Supp. 629, 630 (D. Mass. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 927
(1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1877 (1993).
4 Id.
5 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 4.
6 Brief for Appellee at 2, United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992) [herein-
after Brief for Appellee].
7 Id.
8 Scott; 776 F. Supp. at 632-33.
9 United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1877
(1993).
10 Scott v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1877 (1993).
11 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
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for collection has proved to be a remarkably troublesome legal ques-
tion,12 generating substantial case law and commentary. Since 1967
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been dominated by Katz v.
United States,13 in which the Supreme Court focused the issue of the
constitutionality of warrantless searches on an individual's reasonable
privacy expectations. 14 Katz was significant in that it redirected the
constitutional inquiry away from property-based concepts that had
controlled Fourth Amendment questions since the time of Justice
Holmes.15 Katz required courts to base their analysis on people and
their expectations, rather than on ancient notions of property law.16
In the years following Katz, lower courts frequently encountered gar-
bage search cases, although they reached widely divergent results. It
was not until 1988, twenty-one years after Katz, that the Supreme
Court first addressed trash searches under its tenets. In California v.
Greenwood,'7 the Court concluded that the defendants, who were sus-
pects in a drug investigation, had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the garbage that they had left on the curb in front of their home.'8
Greenwood attracted widespread attention:19 both legal and non-
legal commentary were overwhelmingly negative and derision was
piled on the Court.20 The image of authorities snooping through gar-
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE § 2.6(c), at 475-76 (2d ed. 1987).
'3 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14 Id. at 352 ("One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.").
15 Id. at 353 ("[T]he premise that property interests control the right of the Govern-
ment to search and seize has been discredited.") (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 304 (1966)).
16 Id. at 351 ("But this effort to decide whether or not a given 'area,' viewed in the
abstract, is 'constitutionally protected' deflects attention from the problem presented by
this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.") (footnote omitted).
17 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
18 Id. at 4-41.
19 See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, The Twilight of Privacy, WASH. PosT, June 25, 1988, at A25; Al
Kamen, Court Permits Warrantless Search of Trash, WASH. Posr, May 17, 1988, at A4; David G.
Savage, Trash at Curb is Not Privatejustices Hold, L.A. TMES, May 17, 1988, pt. I at 7; Stuart
Taylor,Jr., Police May Search People's Trash Without a Warrant, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1988, at Al, col. 4; Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Pivacy and Plastic Bags, WAsH. Posr, May 20, 1988,
at A21.
20 See, e.g., Madeline A. Herdrich, Note, California v. Greenwood: The Trashing of Pri-
vacy, 38 Am. U. L. Rrv. 993 (1989); Nancy Burke Rue, Note, Warrantless Search and Seizure of
Curbside Garbage: California v. Greenwood, 58 U. GIN. L. Ray. 361 (1989); Hentoff, supra
note 19, at A25. But see Richard A. Di Lisi, Note, California v. Greenwood: Police Access to
Valuable Garbag 39 CAsE W. REs. L. Ray. 955, 963 (1989) ("Hopefully, [Greenwood] will
enable creative investigators to expose criminal behavior without fear of having their ef-
forts prove unproductive due to the suppression of incriminating evidence.").
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bage, which frequently contains revealing and sensitive details of
one's life,2 ' is at the least chilling and, to some, Orwellian.2 2 Many
would regard as objectively reasonable an expectation that one's trash
will remain private.23
The events surrounding the United States v. Scott litigation are es-
pecially chilling. Government agents not only searched Scott's gar-
bage, but also went to extreme efforts to "painstakingly reconstruct"
the shredded documents. Should a doctrine rooted in privacy sanc-
tion such an intrusion? What efforts must one undertake to secure
oneself against a constitutionally permissible search?
The Scott case presents an accurate view of the present state of
trash search doctrine. Taken together, the two Scott decisions under-
score Greenwood's utter failure to dispose adequately of the legal issues
involved. The Scott litigation illustrates three disparate approaches to
the question of warrantless trash searches. First, the district court
strictly applied the Katz test and consequently achieved a result that
was highly protective of privacy expectations; it held that Scott's pri-
vacy expectations were objectively reasonable. Second, the court of
appeals relied in part on a test under which trash that is "knowingly
21 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of
the person who produced it. A search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate
intimate details about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through
desk drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the tar-
get's financial and professional status, political affiliations and inclinations, private
thoughts, personal relationships, and romantic interests."); California v. Rooney, 483 U.S.
307, 320-21 (1987) (White,J., dissenting) ("[T]rash can reveal a great deal about the life of
its disposer. As respondent eloquently phrases it, the domestic garbage can contains nu-
merous 'tell-tale items on the road-map of life in the previous week.'"); Smith v. State, 510
P.2d 793, 798 (Alaska) ("[A]lmost every human activity ultimately manifests itself in waste
products and ... any individual may understandably wish to maintain the confidentiality of
his refuse."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973); State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Haw.
1985) (trash may expose intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs and "can reveal
much about a person's activities, associations and beliefs.").
22 See BrianJ. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Modelfor Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion, 73 Mfrs. L. Rxv. 583 (1989) ("In short, Orwell envisioned a society without a [F]ourth
[A] mendment to protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.") (referring
to GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1943)). See generally Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood MarshalL
Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 723, 729 (1992) (discussing Jus-
tice Marshall's contributions to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; noting his "acute
awareness of the realities of police confrontations and [his] general distrust of police au-
thority when directed at persons on the street").
23 But see Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recog-
nized and Permitted By Society, "42 DuKE L.J. 727 (1993). Based on a survey of 217 individuals
in the United States and Australia, Professors Slobogin and Schumacher empirically ana-
lyzed perceptions of the relative intrusiveness of various police techniques that have been
challenged before the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. Id. at 737. The survey
asked respondents to rank about fifty such techniques from least intrusive (looking in foli-
age in a public park) to most intrusive (body cavity search at the border). Id. at 738-39.
Going through garbage in opaque bags at curbside was ranked thirteenth out of fifty. Id.
[Vol. 79:452
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exposed" to the public may be subject to a warrantless search. This
approach gives little protection to privacy rights. Finally, both courts
acknowledged, a "bright line" test under which trash left outside the
curtilage24 of a home may be subject to a warrantless search. The
third test draws heavily from property law, long the analytical basis for
trash search cases but thought to be discredited after Katz.
The unique circumstances involved in Alan Scott's case starkly
underscore the dissonance between the privacy-protective approach
of Katz, adopted by the district court, and the "knowing exposure" and
"property-based" approaches on which the court of appeals relied.
Alan Scott used a shredding machine, a device renowned for its effec-
tiveness in securing confidentiality. 25 In fact, because a local ordi-
nance restricted burning,26 Scott had little choice but to shred his
documents to secure privacy. Yet, at least according to the court of
appeals, his privacy expectations were defeated merely by placing the
shredded documents on the curb with his other trash. Interestingly,
many critics of Greenwood assumed that, even after that case, some
steps-including shredding or burning-although burdensome,
would ensure the privacy of trash. 27 These commentators underesti-
mated the extent to which subsequent doctrinal developments would
undermine the central tenets of Katz.
This Note explores the extraordinary paradox by which Scott's
privacy-seeking acts were deemed insufficient against governmental
intrusion under a privacy-protective doctrine. In Part II the Note
traces the development of trash search doctrine, from its original reli-
ance on property law concepts through Katz to the post-Greenwood era.
The Note argues that Greenwood did little to contain a doctrine that,
two decades after Katz, had loose and confusing boundaries. Signifi-
cantly, however, Greenwood did encourage the further development of
the "knowing exposure" test, potentially a far less protective approach
24 See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
26 United States v. Scott, 776 F. Supp. 629, 630 (D. Mass. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 927
(1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1877 (1993).
27 See, e.g., Kevin E. Maldonado, Note, California v. Greenwood: A Proposed Compromise
to theExploitation of the Objective Expectation of Privacy, 38 BuFF. L. REv. 647, 665 (1990) ("In
addition to possible abuses by police, the Greenwood decision will encourage individual
members of society to protect the intimacies, which are revealed in garbage, through a
variety of methods prior to disposing of the refuse on the curb. It is likely that the use of
paper shredders and household incineration will become common practice."); Richard H.
Taylor, Note, California v. Greenwood: A Trashing of the Fourth Amendment? 91 W. VA. L.
REv. 597, 615 (1989) ("[T]hose who wish to protect themselves... and to maintain privacy
in their garbage must resort to other, more expensive, self-help measures such as an invest-
ment in a trash compactor or a paper shredder."); Hentoff, supra note 19, at A25 ("There
are, of course, alternatives to setting out the trash. Shredders. Incinerators. Or, for those
with lesser means, bonfires in the sink."). Greenwood itself, however, did not indicate what,
if anything, one might do to ensure privacy in one's garbage.
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than even traditional property law analysis. The result is that, even
though contemporary garbage search analysis may be under the Katz
doctrine, privacy considerations are, at best, deeply buried. In Part III
the Note assesses the three tests described in the Scott decisions, and
argues that the court of appeals should have affirmed the District
Court's decision, even under the now dominant "knowing exposure"
approach.
The Note outlines the development of trash search doctrine with
the purpose of persuading readers that a search of trash is not neces-
sarily constitutionally sanctioned, notwithstanding the extraordinary
outcome in Scott. A second and more general purpose is to under-
score the point suggested in the Note's title: trash search doctrine has
strayed far beyond Katz's central concern with an individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy and the tenets of that decision are incon-
sistent with the result rendered in Scott.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF TRASH SEARCH DocRnuNE
This Part traces the judicial treatment of warrantless searches of
garbage against the backdrop of the development of general Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The discussion first examines the courts' early
reliance on property law. Next, it analyzes Katz v. United States, the
landmark decision in which the Court rejected property law as disposi-
tive. Then, this Part outlines post-Katz developments, including the
Supreme Court's decision in California v. Greenwood. Finally, the dis-
cussion examines the post-Greenwood era and the two opinions in
United States v. Scott.
A. Pre-Katz Trash Analysis: Intent to Abandon and
Constitutionally Protected Areas
This section outlines the early development of the trash search
doctrine. Since the early part of this century, courts applied tradi-
tional property law concepts to search and seizure cases, including
those involving trash. Hester v. United States28 laid the foundation for
the property-based approach. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
upheld the seizure of whiskey bottles dropped by the defendant in his
father's yard during a chase.29 The Court reasoned that the defen-
dant's own acts revealed the bottles, and therefore, they were aban-
doned.30 Implicit in the Hester analysis is a basic tenet of property law:
when an object is abandoned, the defendant relinquishes property
28 265 U.S. 57 (1924).




rights as to subsequent finders.3 1 Consequently, when police seize the
abandoned property, there are no Fourth Amendment consequences
because the previous owner has relinquished property rights.3 2
The Supreme Court relied on abandonment analysis in its first
trash search case, Abel v. United States.33 Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service agents arrested Rudolph Abel at his hotel.3 4 The agents
assisted Abel as he packed his belongings and checked out.3 5 Later,
authorities searched Abel's room and seized from the wastebasket
items relating to espionage that the defendant had apparently at-
tempted to conceal while packing.36 The Court held that the seized
articles were bona vacantia (unclaimed),37 and thus no unlawful
seizure occurred.38
The abandonment analysis came to incorporate two inquiries:
first, whether the defendant intended to abandon the object recov-
ered by the police, and second, whether the police intrusion took
place in "an area protected by the Fourth Amendment."3 9 Regarding
the first prong, property law "recognize [s] that the act of abandon-
ment is demonstrated by an intention to relinquish all title, posses-
sion, or claim to property, accompanied by some type of activity or
omission by which such intention is manifested."40 Intent is a ques-
tion of fact;4 1 it is not presumed, and "[p]roof supporting it must be
direct or affirmative or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of the
throwing away."42
31 RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 8 (Walter P. Rausenbuch ed.,
1955).
32 See generally Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search and
Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BuFF. L. Rxv. 399, 400-01 (1970-71). Mas-
colo contends that
The significance of abandoned property in the law of search and seizure
lies in the maxim that the protection of the [F]ourth [A]mendment does not
extend to it. Thus, where one abandons property, he is said to bring his
right to privacy therein to an end, and may not later complain about its
subsequent seizure and use in evidence against him. In short, the theory of
abandonment is that no issue of search is presented in such a situation, and
the property so abandoned may be seized without probable cause.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also E.R Branigan, People v. Krivda, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 212
(1974) (analyzing Krivda in light of traditional abandonment doctrine).
33 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
34 Id. at 221.
35 Id. at 224.
36 Id. at 225.
37 Id. Bonavacantiais defined as "[v]acant goods; unclaimed property. Generally, per-
sonal property which escheats to state because no owner, heir or next of kin claims it."
BLAci's LA-W DicrioNARY 177 (6th ed. 1990).
38 Abe, 362 U.S. at 241.
39 LFAvE, supra note 12, at 476.
40 Mascolo, supra note 32, at 401-02.
41 Mascolo, supra note 32, at 402.
42 United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting Foulke v. New York
Consol. R.1, 127 N.E. 237, 238 (N.Y. 1920)).
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The second prong of the abandonment inquiry-whether the
seizure took place in a protected area-is rooted in Hester. The Court
stated in Hester that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth
Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects,' is not extended to the open fields."43 As later construed by the
Court, a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the police have
"physically intruded into 'a constitutionally protected area.' "44 Pro-
tected areas include those specified in the Fourth Amendment-per-
sons, houses, papers and effects-as well as clothing, apartments,
hotel rooms, garages, business offices, stores, warehouses, letters, and
automobiles.45
Work v. United States46 illustrates the application of both prongs of
the abandonment inquiry in the trash seizure context. In Work, the
defendant walked past police and placed something in a trash can
located in an area under the porch.47 When police lifted the lid of
the can, they discovered a "phial"48 of pills. The Work court held that
the defendant had hidden the pills; she had not abandoned them.49
The court of appeals found that there was no abandonment unless
persons impliedly or expressly authorized to remove the trash can's
contents took the phial away. Furthermore, the court noted that the
defendant had not abandoned the pills to the open fields or "other-
wise" so as to lose Fourth Amendment protection.5 0
Under the abandonment approach, the concept of "curtilage"
played a big role in determining constitutionally protected areas. Cur-
tilage originally signified "the land with the castle and out-houses, en-
closed often with high stone walls."51 In Hester, the Supreme Court
noted that the distinction between a person's house and the open
fields is "as old as the common law."52 The Hester Court cited Black-
43 Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
44 LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 302-03 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961)).
45 LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 303.
46 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
47 Id. at 661.
48 A "phial" is defined as "a small glass bottle for medication." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICarONARY 1697 (1986).
49 243 F.2d 660, 662-63. The court focused on the defendant's intent:
The placing of the phial in this receptacle, so situated and used, is not to be
construed as an abandonment of the phial unless to persons impliedly or
expressly authorized to remove the receptacle's contents, such as the
trashmen, for purposes of destruction. In the alleged circumstances of this
case there could not be said to be an abandonment even to those persons;
there was, rather, a hiding.
Id. at 662-63.
50 Id. at 662.
51 Taylor, supra note 27, at 599 n.16 (quoting Coddington v. Dry Dock Co., 31 N.J.L.
477, 485 (1863)).
52 Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
[Vol. 79:452458
NOTE-TRASH SEARCHES
stone's description of a "dwelling house" in a common law burglary:
"no distant barn, warehouse, or the like are under the same privileges,
nor looked upon as a man's castle of defense."53 However, "if the
barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of the mansion-house, and
within the same common fence"54 then the common law element is
established. All "branches and appurtenances" of the main house are
accorded protection "if within the curtilage or homestall."55
In 1928, four years after Hester, the Supreme Court held in Olin-
stead v. United States56 that while Fourth Amendment protections do
not extend to the open fields, they do extend to the area immediately
surrounding the home.57 In fact, it has been said that the curtilage
begins where open fields end.58 Courts assessed the dimensions of
the curtilage on a case-by-case basis.59
The scope of intent to abandon and constitutionally protected
areas served as the focus of the Fourth Amendment inquiry until the
late 1960s.60 A 1962 Third Circuit case, United States v. Minker,61 is
typical of cases applying the traditional property analysis in the con-
text of garbage searches. In Minker, IRS agents arranged with a gar-
bage collector to set aside and turn over to them garbage collected
from a small apartment complex where the defendant lived.62 The
agents found adding machine tapes and other slips of paper. The
court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because
the defendant had intended to abandon the material and the search
had not occurred within the curtilage of defendant's apartment. 63
B. Katz v. United States. Property Analysis Abandoned
The Supreme Court began to show discomfort with its property-
based approach because it failed to address adequately the central




56 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
57 Id. at 440.
58 Mascolo, supra note 32, at 413 n.74.
59 See, e.g. Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1966) ("The reach
of the curtilage depends on the facts of a case."). More recently, in 1986, the Supreme
Court established a four-part inquiry to determine the extent of a dwelling's curtilage. In
United States v. Dunn, the Court identified four relevant factors: first, the proximity of the
area claimed to be curtilage to the home; second, whether the area is included within an
enclosure surrounding the home; third, the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and
fourth, the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people
passing by. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-03 (1986).
60 Serr, supra note 22, at 590-94.
61 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963).
62 Id. at 634.
63 Id. at 634-35.
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concern of the Fourth Amendment.64 Beginning with the landmark
case Katz v. United States, decided in 1967,65 the Supreme Court em-
barked on a new approach based on an individual's expectation of
privacy. Katz signaled that the Court was prepared to release the
Fourth Amendment from "the moorings of precedent and determine
its scope by the logic of its central concepts": protection of "the pri-
vacy of the citizen from unreasonable government investigation." 66
In Katz, government agents suspected Katz of conducting an ille-
gal gambling operation from a public telephone booth.67 Agents
placed a listening device on the outside of the booth and monitored
Katz's conversations.68 The evidence obtained was introduced at trial
and Katz was convicted.69
The Supreme Court reversed and forcefully rejected a property-
based inquiry to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court rejected the government's argument that there was no Fourth
Amendment issue involved because there was no physical intrusion
into the phone booth from which Katz placed his calls.70 Rather, the
"premise that property interests control the right of the Government
to search and seize has been discredited."71 The Court noted that
"once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people-
and not simply 'areas' . . . it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure."72 In a passage that would play a
central role in the later development of the doctrine, the Court also
stated: "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessi-
ble to the public, may be constitutionally protected."73 Applying the
new rule, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protected the
contents of the defendant's phone calls.
Justice Harlan's concurrence refined the rule of Katz: "My under-
standing of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that
64 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("We have recognized that
the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than
property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on prop-
erty concepts.").
65 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
66 Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968
Sup. CT. REv. 133, 133-35 (1968).
67 Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 348.
70 Id. at 352-53.
71 Id. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
72 Id. at 353.
73 Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 79:452460
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there is a twofold requirement, first, that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expec-
tation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "74
Harlan distinguished between the home, which "for most purposes [is]
a place where [one] expects privacy" and "objects, activities, or state-
ments that [one] exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders. .. ."75 The
latter "are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to [one-
self] has been exhibited."76 According to Justice Harlan, the point is
not that a phone booth is generally accessible to the public, but rather
that it is "a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants'
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reason-
able." 77 The entire Court later adopted the Harlan formulation, 78
and it remains the prevailing view today.79
Courts broadly applied the Katz privacy test in a variety of search
and seizure contexts.8 " It changed the focus of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence from whether the police were literally searching a con-
stitutionally protected area to whether the police were intruding on
an individual's expectation of privacy.8 ' In Tery v. Ohio,8 2 decided
one year after Katz, the Court stated that "[w] e have recently held that
'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,' . . . and wher-
ever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,'
... he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion. '8 3 More recently, in Oliver v. United States, the Court reaffirmed
the fundamental premise of Katz-that property law considerations
are not controlling:
The common law may guide consideration of what areas are pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment by defining areas whose invasion
by others is wrongful. The law of trespass, however, forbids intru-
74 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan continued:
Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy,
but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of
outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself
has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would
not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
75 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
76 Id
77 Id.
78 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (explaining a two-part inquiry first,
whether the defendant had a subjective privacy expectation, and second, whether such an
expectation was reasonable).
79 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
80 LAFAvE, supra note 12, at 306.
81 Serr, supra note 22, at 592.
82 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
83 Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
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sions upon land that the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe.
For trespass law extends to instances where the exercise of the right
to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest.8 4
C. Post-Katz Trash Decisions: A Mixed Bag
Prior to Katz, courts had relied exclusively on property-law con-
cepts when deciding trash seizure cases. Notwithstanding Katz's indi-
cation that property law was no longer dispositive, with only a few
exceptions, courts have generally continued to rely on property law in
trash cases. This section discusses developments in this area of the law
after Katz. First, it analyzes two California decisions that adopted the
Katz approach. Second, it examines developments in property law
analysis, which has remained the dominant approach.
1. Edwards and Krivda: California Adopts the Katz Expectation of
Privacy Formulation
California was the leading jurisdiction to apply the expectation of
privacy analysis to trash seizure cases.85 Two years after Katz, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court analyzed the reasonableness of an expectation
of privacy in discarded garbage in People v. Edwards.8 6 The defen-
dant's neighbor had reported a "green vegetable substance" in a torn
bag on defendant's back porch. Police officers, operating without a
warrant, entered the defendant's open porch door, and found a bag
containing marijuana.8 7 The court invoked property law analysis and
held that the defendants had not abandoned the marijuana seeds in
the trash cans. The court noted, however, that:
In the light of the combined facts and circumstances it appears that
defendants exhibited an expectation of privacy, and we believe that
expectation was reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
We can readily ascribe many reasons why residents would not want
their castaway clothing, letters, medicine bottles or other telltale re-
fuse and trash to be examined by neighbors or others, at least not
until the trash has lost its identity and meaning by becoming part of
a large conglomeration of trash elsewhere. Half truths leading to
rumor and gossip may readily flow from an attempt to "read" the
contents of another's trash. 88
Edwards is significant because of the California court's application
of the Katz privacy analysis. Even though the defendant in Edwards
84 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1983).
85 In the period between Katz and Greenwood, the Hawaii Supreme Court also held
that a warrantless seizure of trash left at curbside violated its state constitution. State v.
Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Haw. 1985).
86 458 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1969).
87 Id. at 716.
88 Id. at 718.
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demonstrated an intention to part with the disposed items forever,
that intent was not determinative: "[a] justified expectation of privacy
may exist as to items which have been abandoned in the property law
sense, just as it is true that no such expectation may exist on some
occasions even though the property has not been abandoned."8 9
Two years after Edwards, the California Supreme Court applied
Harlan's "expectation of privacy" analysis and concluded that a curb-
side garbage search was illegal. In People v. Krivda,90 the Los Angeles
police received an anonymous tip that the defendants were involved
in illegal drug activity. After garbage collectors had picked up the
defendants' trash, the police searched the garbage and found mari-
juana seeds.9' In a four to three decision, the California court held
that the seizure of the trash was invalid because the lack of a search
warrant frustrated defendants' reasonable expectations of privacy.
The court observed that the Fourth Amendment protects against "un-
reasonable searches and seizures, not trespasses." 92 The court rea-
soned that although it may be reasonable to expect that vagrants,
children or animals may rummage through garbage set out for collec-
tion, it is not reasonable to expect the police to do so without a war-
rant.93 In short, the California court broadly affirmed the essence of
Katz: it rejected the property law abandonment test and found that
the Fourth Amendment protects privacy, not just property.94 On re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court,95 the California court
clarified that its decision in Krivda was grounded in both the Fourth
Amendment and in Article One of the California Constitution.96
Other courts, however, have reached different results when apply-
ing Katz's principles to garbage searches. In an oft-cited case, Smith v.
State,97 the Alaska Supreme Court in 1973 found that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left in a dumpster of a
89 LAFAvE, supra note 12, at 477-78.
90 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971), vacate, 409 U.S. 33 (1972) (per curiam), aftd, 504 P.2d
457 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
91 Krivda, 486 P.2d at 1262.
92 Id. at 1267.
93 Id. at 1268. This distinction was first made by the Edwards Court. A defendant may
expect trash to come into the hands of garbage collectors but not neighbors or the police.
Edwards, 458 P.2d at 718. But cf. United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973-74 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978) (noting that since rummagers and animals often strew
trash about and expose it to public view, a person can have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in garbage set out for collection).
94 Branigan, supra note 32, at 227. The dissent in Krivda underscores the departure
from traditional analysis in the majority's opinion. The dissent, distinguishing Edwards,
argued that once trash cans are moved to the street from the constitutionally protected
area surrounding the home, one must assume that the garbage collector may become an
agent of the government. Krivda, 486 P.2d at 1270 (Wright, J., dissenting).
95 California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
96 People v. Krivda, 504 P.2d 457 (1973).
97 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
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multi-unit dwelling. Although the court cited the language from Ed-
wards discussing the desirability of privacy in trash, it nevertheless ob-
served: "Understandable as this desire for confidentiality may be, it is
not conclusive of society's willingness to recognize an expectation of
privacy in a garbage receptacle as reasonable."98 The court went on to
note that, in light of the garbage's location, "it would be reasonable to
expect trash to be accidentally removed... by running children, pass-
ing cars, stray dogs, or even a visitor."99
Smith was decided over a strong dissent by Chief Justice Rabino-
witz. Rabinowitz criticized the majority's "importation into the realm
of constitutional analysis of 'traditional property law concepts' such as
'abandonment' and 'relinquishment of title, possession or claim to
property.' "100
2. Abandonment: The Majority Approach in the Post-Katz Era
Among post-Katz trash cases, Edwards and Krivda stand out as un-
usual. The overwhelming majority of courts, in an implicit repudia-
tion of Katz, continued to rely on abandonment analysis. Indicative of
this approach is United States v. Mustone, 10 a case decided by the First
Circuit in 1972.102 In Mustone, Secret Service agents suspected the de-
fendants of conducting a counterfeiting operation. Consequently,
they searched garbage placed by the defendants at their curbside for
collection; evidence found in the garbage provided the agents with
probable cause to conduct a second search. The trial court denied
defendants' motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to these
searches. The court affirmed noting that because one of the defend-
ants had placed the trash on the sidewalk, it was abandoned. 03
The Mustone court pointedly rejected the California Supreme
Court's reasoning in Krivda, and by extension, Katz, and relied instead
on property law analysis. In a footnote, the court noted the following
language in Katz: "what [the defendant] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected." 10 4 This language, the Mustone court concluded, was not an
"adequate answer to the abandonment argument." 10 5 Instead, the
court suggested a link between the property and privacy approaches:
98 Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 798 (Alaska 1973).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 801 (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting).
101 469 F.2d 970 (lst Cir. 1972). For other post-Katz cases similar to Mustone seeJames
A. Bush & Rece Bly, Note, Expectation of Privacy Analysis and Warrantless Trash Reconnaissance
After Katz v. United States, 23 ARiz. L. REv. 283, 300 n.138 (1981).
102 Bush & Bly, supra note 101, at 300.
103 Mustone, 469 F.2d at 970.
104 Id. at 972 n.1 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)).
105 Id. at 972 n.1.
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"[i]mplicit in the concept of abandonment is a renunciation of any
'reasonable' expectation of privacy in the property abandoned."106 In
other words, according to the court, physical abandonment is suffi-
cient to evince an intent to renounce any expectation of privacy. Sig-
nificantly, under this approach to abandonment, no further inquiry
with regard to intent is apparently required. As two commentators
correctly noted:
Unfortunately, the courts that apply the abandonment theory fre-
quently do not analyze the underlying issue properly. Certainly
there is little doubt that when garbage is set out for collection or
placed in a public receptacle there is a physical abandonment. But
what is absolutely unwarranted is the quantum leap from physical
abandonment to a conclusive presumption of intent to waive any
expectation of privacy. Since the burden is on the government to
justify the validity of a warrantless search, a court should not pre-
sume the waiver of a constitutional right.10 7
The reasoning reflected in these early post-Katz decisions pro-
vided the foundation for the subsequent development of trash doc-
trine. Courts did not supplant the well-worn abandonment test with
an inquiry focusing on privacy expectations.' 08 Instead, as Mustone
demonstrated, courts rationalized property concepts into the frame-
work suggested by Katz. Property concepts remained controlling. In
the post-Katz era, all federal circuits that considered the issue, as well
as some federal district and most state courts, adopted an abandon-
ment approach similar to Mustone.10 9 In fact, many federal courts
merely cited other federal cases to support their decisions, without
analyzing privacy considerations. 110
D. California v. Greenwood: The Supreme Court's Post-Katz
Garbage Analysis
The doctrinal tension between Krivda's privacy-based approach
and Mustoni's property-based approach remained unresolved for al-
most two decades before the Supreme Court squarely addressed trash
106 Id. at 972. Among the cases cited by the court for support is United States v.
Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963). For discussion of
Minker, see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
107 Bush & Bly, supra note 101, at 301-02. See also United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299,
809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983). In Teny, the court concluded that:
(I]n the absence of evidence indicating an intent by the former owner to
retain some control over or interest in discarded trash, his placement of it
for collection on a public sidewalk is inconsistent with the notion that he
retains a privacy interest in it. His act is one of abandonment.
Id.
108 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
109 Bush & Bly, supra note 101, at 301 n.148.
110 Bush & Bly, supra note 101, at 802 n.151.
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searches in California v. Greenwood.' During the same period, the
Katz doctrine of privacy protection was eroded in other contexts.11 2
To a doctrine already suffering from a lack of authoritative definition,
California v. Greenwood only added greater confusion and
contradiction.
In 1984, the Laguna Beach Police Department suspected Billy
Greenwood and Dyanne Van Houten of narcotics trafficking. The in-
vestigating police officer asked the neighborhood's regular trash col-
lector to pick up the plastic garbage bags that Greenwood had left on
the curb in front of his house and turn them over to her.113 An in-
spection revealed evidence of narcotics use and, on that basis, the po-
lice obtained a warrant to search Greenwood's home." 4 Upon
executing the search, the police discovered cocaine and hashish and
the police arrested Greenwood and Van Houten on narcotics
charges." 5 Released on bail, the defendants again came under police
suspicion. Once again, the police secured Greenwood's garbage from
the trash collector, leading to another search of Greenwood's
house." 6 After finding more evidence of narcotics use, the police ar-
rested Greenwood for a second time." 7
The California Superior Court, relying on Krivda, dismissed the
charges against the defendants." 8 The Court of Appeal affirmed, not-
ing, however, that had Krivda been based solely on the California Con-
stitution it would no longer be binding. After Krivda was decided, a
state constitutional amendment was enacted which barred the sup-
pression of evidence obtained in violation of California law." 9 The
California Supreme Court denied review, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.120
The Greenwood majority opinion, written by Justice White, used
Katz as a starting point for its analysis. The Court found that the de-
fendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy, reasoning that it is
"common knowledge" that garbage bags are readily accessible to ani-
mals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the pub-
lic. 12 1 Moreover, the court noted that the defendants left their trash
with the express purpose of conveying it to a third party who could
111 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
112 See, e.g., Serr, supra note 22.
113 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37.





119 Id. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
120 483 U.S. 1019 (1987).




inspect the trash himself or allow the police to do so. Because the
defendants placed trash in " 'an area particularly suited for public in-
spection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption'" the
Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy. 122
The majority asserted that "[w] hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection" because police cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to avert their eyes from incriminating evidence. 123 For this
proposition the Court quoted Katz.124 Critically, however, the Court's
quotation is incomplete as Katz's next sentence reads: "But what [a
person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." 25
To further support its retreat from Katz's privacy protection ap-
proach, the Greenwood majority cited two cases in which the Court
found there to be no reasonable expectation of privacy. The first case
cited, Smith v. Maryland, held that there was no constitutional bar to a
phone company recording the numbers dialed by a criminal suspect
because "a person has no legitimate expectations of privacy in infor-
mation he voluntarily turns over to third parties."1 26 In the second
case cited, California v. Ciraolo, the Court held that the defendant had
no expectation of privacy in his backyard from a surveillance plane
because "any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced
down could have seen everything [the police] observed." 127
Finally, the Greenwood Court relied on the nearly unanimous re-
jection of similar claims by federal courts of appeals in finding that
the defendants' privacy expectations were objectively unreasonable. 28
122 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41 (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399
(3d Cir. 1981)).
123 Id. at 41 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
124 Id. at 41.
125 Kat, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
126 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
127 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
128 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41-42 (citing United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432,
1437 (9th Cir. 1986)); United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1312-1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820
(1984); United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 49 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v.
Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 791-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983); United States v.
Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 308-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v.
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-01
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Crowell,
586 F.2d 1020, 1025 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979); Magda v. Benson, 536
F.2d 111, 112-13 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970,972-
74 (1st Cir. 1972); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska), cert. denied; 414 U.S. 1086 (1973);
State v. Fassler, 503 P.2d 807, 813-814 (Ariz. 1972); State v. Schultz, 388 So.2d 1326 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Huddleston, 347 N.E.2d 76 (IM. 1976); Commonweallth v.
Chappee, 492 N.E.2d 719, 721-22 (Mass. 1986); People v. Whotte, 317 N.W.2d 266 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1982); State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982); State v. Ronngren, 361
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For example, the Court favorably cited the First Circuit's post-Katz de-
cision in Mustone, which rejected an expectation of privacy analysis in
favor of abandonment. 29 Indeed, the Greenwood majority went so far
as to quote the District of Columbia Circuit's observation in United
States v. Thornton that "the overwhelming weight of authority rejects
the proposition that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with
respect to trash discarded outside the curtilege [sic] thereof."30
Forcefully dissenting, Justice Brennan argued that a trash bag is
similar to other containers that the Court had held sufficient to pro-
tect privacy expectations. 13 Moreover, privacy expectations did not
diminish merely because the garbage bags were used to dispose of
items rather than transport them.132 Justice Brennan also noted that
local ordinances prohibiting others from rummaging through gar-
bage reinforced individuals' privacy expectations. 33
Justice Brennan responded to the majority's failure to find a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy by arguing that the Court should look
to "understandings that are recognized and permitted by society."13 4
"Most of us, ...." Brennan continued, "would be incensed to discover a
meddler... scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to discover some
detail of our personal lives."' 35 Brennan noted public outrage after a
reporter had sorted through Henry Kissinger's trash and published
his findings.136 Brennan conceded, however, that had Greenwood
"flaunted" his garbage by "strewing" it over the sidewalk, his expecta-
tion of privacy would have been unreasonable.13 7
N.W.2d 224, 228-30 (N.D. 1985); State v. Brown, 484 N.E.2d 215, 217-18 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984); Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 656 (Okla. Grim. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935
(1985); State v. Purvis, 438 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Or. 1968); Commonwealth v. Minton, 432
A.2d 212, 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Grim. App.
1975); State v. Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788, 794-97 (Wisc.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985);
Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Wyo. 1970)).
129 See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
130 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 42 (citing United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 49 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)).
Support for a bright line interpretation of the Greenwood opinion also may be based
upon Justice White's characterization of this case:
The issue here is whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless
search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a
home. We conclude, in accordance with the vast majority of lower courts
that have addressed the issue, that it does not.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
131 Id. at 46-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 49.
133 Id. at 52.
134 Id. at 51 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978)).
135 Id. at 51-52.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 51-53.
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Greenwood suggests at least three approaches to analyzing trash
cases, but fails to indicate which it ultimately regards as controlling.
The first analytical approach relied upon was an application of Katz,
under which the Court concluded that the defendant's privacy expec-
tations were unreasonable. Second, the Court asserted that because
the defendants "knowingly exposed" their garbage, their privacy ex-
pectations were necessarily defeated. Third, the Court, at least implic-
itly, endorsed a "bright line"' 38 test under which no privacy
expectations can attach to garbage left outside the curtilage.
Because Greenwood failed to reconcile these three approaches,
trash search doctrine remained confused. Two of the approaches em-
ployed by the Greenwood majority-the bright line and the knowing
exposure tests-are inconsistent with a faithful application of the
other approach-the Katz expectation of privacy test. The bright line
test depends on the property based concepts of abandonment and
curtilage. Katz forcefully rejected such property notions as control-
ling. In fact, one year before Greenwood, Katz's author, Justice White,
explicitly rejected the role of property interests in Fourth Amendment
analysis.' 3 9
Similarly, the Greenwood Court's use of the knowing exposure test
is inconsistent with the totality of the Katz rule. The concept of know-
ing exposure is derived from Katz, in that what a person "knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home ... is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.... But what [a person] seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be consti-
tutionally protected." 40 By using only the first sentence of this
quoted passage, however, the Greenwood court broke the doctrine away
the central tenets of the Fourth Amendment. According to Katz,
138 The phrase "bright line" is the term used by the district court in United States v.
Scott, 776 F. Supp. 629, 631 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1877 (1993). See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. A more conceptually accu-
rate phrase might be "property line" for that incorporates the essence of the test. Green-
wood's indulgence in this approach is especially underscored by its favorable quotation of
this District of Columbia Circuit for the proposition that there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy with respect to trash discarded outside the curtilage. See supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
'39 California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987) (per curiam) (WhiteJ, dissenting).
Justice White stated that:
I assume that under state law [defendant] retained an ownership or posses-
sory interest in the trash bag and its contents. [Defendant's] propertyinter-
est, however, does not settle the matter for Fourth Amendment purposes,
for the reach of the Fourth Amendment is not determined by state property
law. As we have said, the premise that property interests control the right
of officials to search and seize has been discredited.
Id. At issue in Rooney was a warrantless trash search of a communal trash container. Id. at
308. The Court did not reach the issue of defendant's privacy expectations because the
state court did not reach the issue. Id. at 312-13.
140 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
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one's knowing exposure of material to a publicly accessible area
defeats privacy expectations only when one does not seek to preserve it as
private.
Both the bright line and knowing exposure tests belie the funda-
mental proposition for which Katz stands: the Fourth Amendment is
concerned with individual expectations of privacy and privacy may not
be measured accurately by the artificial confines of ancient notions of
property law. Not only did the Greenwood Court fail to focus trash
seizure analysis on the core principle of Katz, but it also engaged in a
scatter-shot and inconclusive analysis that left three conceptually dis-
parate tests standing.
E. Post-Greenwood Decisions: Bright Line and Knowing Exposure
Tests
Of the three lines of analysis identified in Greenwood, lower fed-
eral courts addressing trash search issues since that decision have re-
lied primarily on two: the bright line and knowing exposure
approaches. No federal court relied exclusively on the third ap-
proach-a pure Katz analysis of expectation of privacy-until the dis-
trict court opinion in Scott.141 However, two state supreme courts,
relying on their respective state constitutions for authority, have fo-
cused on privacy considerations. 142 This section will examine post-
Greenwood analysis under the bright line and knowing exposure
approaches.
The Second Circuit, and at least one district court, have adopted
the bright line analysis used by the Greenwood court. 43 Under this
approach, location is the determinative factor: if the garbage is placed
outside the curtilage of the dwelling, then no Fourth Amendment
protections exist. 44
The most significant development of the post-Greenwood era, how-
ever, has been the expansion of the knowing exposure test. The 1991
141 United States v. Scott, 776 F. Supp. 629 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.
1991), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1877 (1993). See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text and
infra 150-75 and accompanying text.
142 See State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) and State v. Hempele,
576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990). But see State v. Defusco, 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993) (holding
that the expectation of privacy in garbage placed outside is not reasonable).
143 United States v. Carmona, 858 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1988) (refused to disturb deci-
sion below allowing evidence seized from "trash cans placed on the street curb, outside the
private grounds of the house"). See also United States v. 987 Fisher Rd., 719 F. Supp. 1396,
1406 (E.D. Mich. 1989) ("closed garbage bags, while within the curtilage of a backyard, are
entitled to fourth amendment protection from police intrusion until they are taken to the
curbside or removed from the premises by the owner or [garbage] collector").
For the basis of this approach in Greenwood, see supra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text.
144 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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Seventh Circuit decision of United States v. Hedrick leads these knowing
exposure cases. 145 Kenneth Hedrick, indicted for possession and dis-
tribution of cocaine and for money laundering, moved to suppress
evidence obtained from a warrantless search of garbage bags placed in
cans within the curtilage of his home.146 The Hedrick court inter-
preted Greenwood's reasoning as follows: because "[i]t is common
knowledge that garbage bags placed on or at the side of a street are
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and
[others]" and because the garbage was placed with the "express pur-
pose of conveying to a third party," the defendant had "no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the garbage deposited in an area particularly
suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public con-
sumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it."147
Importantly, under the knowing exposure approach, neither the
presence of garbage inside the curtilage nor the defendant's intent to
convey it to the garbage collector necessarily controls. Rather, as for-
mulated by the Seventh Circuit in Hedrick, a court should determine
whether the garbage is in such a place that it is "accessible to the pub-
lic" and "likely to be viewed by the public."' 48 If so, the garbage is
"knowingly exposed" to the public for Fourth Amendment pur-
145 United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 147
(1991).
146 Id. at 397. The cans were located on a driveway 50 feet south of the house; 20 feet
from the unattached garage; 25-30 feet west of the street and 18 feet west of the public
sidewalk. Id.
147 According to the court, garbage left at curbside is "in an area particularly suited for
public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express pur-
pose of having strangers take it." Id. at 397-98 (citing United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d
397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981); Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41).
The Hedrick court relied on the 1983 Seventh Circuit decision, United States v.
Kramer, 711 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983), which was cited favorably
by the Greenwood majority. Kramer relied partially on an abandonment theory and partially
on a theory of accessibility. Police seized garbage in cans that Kramer had placed by the
roadside for collection. The cans were located just inside a knee-high chain fence that ran
along the street curb. Kramer, 711 F.2d at 791-94. The Kramer court sustained the trial
judge's holding that "the special protection the Fourth Amendment accords people in
their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' does not extend to their discarded garbage."
Id. at 792 (quoting United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931
(1983)).
148 Hedrick, 922 F.2d at 400. The court notes that:
[t] his principle is not without any limit. The willingness of members of the
public to trespass upon private property in order to search through garbage
cans cannot automatically defeat the Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy any more than a series of burglaries could eliminate any expecta-
tion of privacy in the home. Where, however, the garbage is readily accessi-
ble from the street or other public thoroughfares, an expectation of privacy
may be objectively unreasonable because of the common practice of scav-




poses.149 Thus, although decided under the rubric of the Katz deci-
sion, the knowing exposure test is concerned primarily with place
rather with than privacy.
F. United States v. Scott Is Shredded Trash Private?
The unusual facts in United States v. Scott presented an entirely
new application of trash search doctrine. The disparate approaches
taken by the district court and the First Circuit in Scott underscore the
failure of Greenwood to clarify the proper analytical approach. Indeed,
Scott demonstrated the extent to which Greenwood propagated a con-
ceptually loose and contradictory doctrine. This section analyzes the
two courts' approaches in Scott after first setting forth the background
of the case.
Beginning in 1988, the IRS permitted authorized tax preparers to
file returns electronically. In January 1989, a Massachusetts book-
keeper, Alan N. Scott, received approval from the government to file
returns to the IRS from his personal computer via a telephone
modem. 150
Several months later, the IRS learned of a potential scheme in
Massachusetts to defraud the government by means of filing false tax
returns.151 Federal investigators discovered forty-seven returns that
the named taxpayer had not authorized, of which thirty-four had been
filed electronically. 152 These returns yielded large refunds. 153 The re-
funds either were dispersed to private mail drops or were deposited
electronically into bank accounts from which the funds were later
withdrawn through automatic teller machines.' 54
In June 1989, the IRS investigation focused on Scott. Scott previ-
ously had been convicted of filing false claims against the govern-
ment' 55 in a scheme involving the use of names and social security
numbers of several persons with whom Scott had worked. 156
On June 28, 1989 and every week thereafter, the IRS conducted
searches of Scott's garbage. 157 An IRS agent, posing as a trash collec-
tor, would pick up Scott's garbage from the curb directly in front of
149 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). But see supra notes 123-35 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of how the parsed use of this quotation has distorted its
meaning.





155 Id. at 3-4. The government conceded, however, that Scott did file ten legitimate
returns during the 1989 filing period. Id. at 2.
156 Id. at 4.
157 Id
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Scott's house.158 Much of the trash that was collected had been shred-
ded.159 A great deal of the shredded material was "painstakingly re-
construct[ed]" by two IRS agents. 160 The reconstructed documents
served as the basis for two search warrants that the IRS obtained. The
subsequent search of Scott's house resulted in seizures of numerous
papers and effects.' 61 The seized documents, along with those recon-
structed from Scott's trash, constituted virtually all of the evidence
against Scott.162 In August 1991, a grand jury indicted Scott for filing
false tax claims.165
1. District Court Opinion: Application of the Katz Expectation of
Privacy Test
At trial, Scott moved to suppress the reconstructed documents as
well as the material later acquired by authority of the search warrants.
Scott argued that the warrantless searches of his garbage had been
conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that, conse-
quently, the later obtained materials were "fruits of the poisonous
tree."164
The district court held three hearings on the motion. 165 Ulti-
mately, the district court sustained Scott's motion to suppress. Judge
Tauro assessed Greenwood's requirements in a memorandum sus-
taining Scott's position. Essential to the court's holding was its read-
ing of Greenwood's interpretation of the Katz expectation of privacy
test.166 The district court rejected the government's argument that
Greenwood should be read as requiring a bright line test under which
no privacy expectations attach to garbage left at the curb.167 The
158 Id.
159 Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 4.
160 United States v. Scott, 776 F. Supp. 629, 630 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1877 (1993) (quoting Aff. of Agent DennisJ. Wlodyka 5F
(Aug. 15, 1991)).
161 Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 4.
162 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 4.
163 Scott, 776 F. Supp. at 630.
164 Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 2.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 4-5.
167 Scott, 776 F. Supp. at 631. In arguing that a bright line rule should apply, the gov-
ernment relied on a First Circuit case, United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2813 (1991), in which the court rejected defendant's privacy claim.
The district court distinguished Wilkinson by noting that:
[the decision] does not support the government's assertion that Greenwood
established a bright line rule. Rather, Wilkinson was a fact specific applica-
tion of the Greenwood standard. In Wilkinson, the defendant had placed his
trash bags within barrels on his own lawn, as opposed to in plastic bags at
the curb, as was the situation in Greenwood The [court of appeals] deter-
mined these circumstances were "distinctions without a difference," that
did not amount to an elevated expectation of privacy.
Scott, 776 F. Supp. at 631 (citation omitted).
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court instead read Greenwood to require that courts employ a two-part
analysis, based on language in Katz. First, the court must determine
whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy.168 Second, the court must determine whether society would ac-
cept that expectation as objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. 169
Applying the two-part test, the court held that Scott, by shredding
his papers, "clearly indicated his intention that no one read them."170
Noting that "numerous manuals and articles indicate that shredding is
widely viewed as an appropriate way to ensure... privacy" and that
the growth in the shredding industry has been fueled by a "consumer
awareness of the need to destroy . . sensitive information,"' 71 the
court further found that Scott had demonstrated reasonableness of
his expectation of privacy. The court asserted that "[p]ersuasive case
law [supports] the proposition that an individual has privacy interests
in shredded documents"172 and that "an individual may manifest a
privacy interest in his garbage." 178 Judge Tauro distinguished the
Greenwood Court's observation that it is "common knowledge" that
snoops and scavengers have access to curbside trash by asserting that it
is not" 'common knowledge' that snoops and scavengers may retrieve
shredded materials and then 'painstakingly reconstruct' them to learn
the contents."174 Therefore, the court concluded, "[s] ociety would ac-
cept as reasonable Scott's belief that once he shredded his docu-
ments, they would be shielded from public examination." 75
The government's brief to the court of appeals in Scott reiterated its argument for a
bright line reading of Greenwood. Potential support for a bright line construction can also
be found in the Greenwood Court's favorable citation of United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d
39 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a brief discussion of this case, see supra note 130 and accompany-
ing text.
168 Scott, 776 F. Supp. at 631.
169 Id.
170 Id. The court noted that "the operating instructions accompanying [Scott's] shred-
der state that its purpose is 'to dispose of confidential documents in a secure manner'." Id.
The court also noted that, "in Boston, shredding may be the most effective and practical
means for destroying documents as the burning of trash without a permit violates fire and
air pollution regulations." Id. (citing Boston, Mass., Fire Prevention Code §§ 15.01, 15.04
(Aug. 17, 1979); Mass. Regulations for Control of Atmospheric Pollution §§ 1, 6.1 (Dec. 17,
1976)).
171 Id. at 631-32 (citations omitted).
172 Id. at 632 (citing Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Kramer, 711 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983)).
173 Id. at 632 (citing United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
931 (1983); United States v. Crowell, 586 F. 2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
959 (1979)).




2. The Court of Appeals Opinion: Application of the Bright Line
and Knowing Exposure Tests
The court of appeals rejected the district court's privacy-based in-
quiry and instead relied on the two other dominant strands of con-
temporary trash seizure doctrine-the bright line and knowing
exposure tests. 176
According to the court's interpretation of Greenwood, there is no
constitutional proscription against the "warrantless search and seizure
of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home, except 'if
respondents [have] manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in
their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.' "177 The
court concluded, however, that the trash at issue in Scott was "public
trash." Irrespective of Scott's intent to keep the documents secret, the
court noted that "there can be no doubt that [Scott] also intended to
dispossess himself of those documents once they were shredded" by
putting the documents in an area where third parties, without any
limitations, were placed in control. 18 According to the court, the de-
fendant was forewarned that there was no legitimate expectation of
privacy because the Supreme Court had held in Greenwood that war-
rantless seizure of trash left for collection did not offend societal
values. 179
Next, the panel reasoned that trash placed at a curb for disposal
by a third person is abandoned "because 'implicit in the concept of
176 Scot4 975 F.2d 927, 928 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1877 (1993).
177 Id. at 928 (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988)) (emphasis added). The
court of appeals never fully develops this unusual reading of the requirement. The court
appears to be suggesting that abandonment outside the curtilage is dispositive unless the
defendant manifests an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. However, Greenwood
is commonly read as holding that no expectation of privacy can exist as to trash outside the
curtilage. See, e.g., United States v. 986 Fisher Rd., 719 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
For practical purposes, however, the court of appeals' interpretation represents a meaning-
less distinction as it is hard to conceive of what steps an individual might take beyond
shredding to manifest his privacy expectations.
178 Scott 975 F.2d at 929.
179 Id. Here, the court quotes Greenwood.
[H]aving deposited their garbage in an area particularly suited for public
inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the ex-
press purpose of having strangers take it, respondents could have had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they
discarded.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41). The
court then cites United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 27 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2813 (1991), which held that trash bags within barrels on the defendant's lawn were not
entitled to an expectation of privacy. The court noted that " [o] ther circuits agree with this
view of the Fourth Amendment" and mentioned as examples United States v. Comeaux,
955 F.2d 586,589 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 135 (1992) and United States v. Hedrick,
922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 147 (1991). For a discussion of Hedrick's
(and by extension, Comeaux's) knowing exposure interpretation of Greenwood, see supra
notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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abandonment is a renunciation of any reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the property abandoned.'"' 80 In a footnote, the court
summarily dismissed the defendant's contention that the Greenwood
Court rejected abandonment.' 8 ' Moreover, according to the First Cir-
cuit, shredding does not change the consequences of abandonment:
"[H]ad an errant breeze blown shredded documents from appellee's
desk into the street into the open window of a passing police car the
government would certainly have been free to seize the incriminating
evidence without a warrant."'8 2 Indeed, the court noted that the case
did not involve a viblation of constitutionally protected rights, but
rather, "a failed attempt at secrecy by reason of underestimation of
police resourcefulness" 83 in overcoming shredding technology.
The court then compared the act of shredding garbage and plac-
ing it in the public domain with that of attempting to keep secret pri-
vate conversations conducted in a public place: "Both are failed
attempts at maintaining privacy whose failure can only be attributed
to the conscious acceptance by the actor of obvious risk factors." 84
Finally, the court stated that the "mere fact" that the appellant had
shredded his garbage does not create a "reasonable heightened ex-
pectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment" inasmuch as Scott
discarded his garbage in an area suited for public inspection and con-
sumption. 18 5 According to the First Circuit, the Fourth Amendment
"does not protect appellant when a third party expends the effort and
expense to solve the jigsaw puzzle created by shredding." 186
180 Scott, 975 F.2d at 929 (quoting United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir.
1972)).
181 In his brief to the court, Scott had argued that "by embracing a privacy analysis,
[the Greenwood majority] rejected the argument that trash abandoned by its prior owner was
not subject to Fourth Amendment protection." Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 5. Scott
noted that Justice White, author of the majority opinion, had rejected abandonment in
California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307 (1984) (per curiam). The court responded:
Although appellee contends that the Supreme Court rejected abandon-
ment as a basis for deciding Greenwood, the.., language in the Greenwood
majority opinion, which specifically refers to discarding inculpatory items,
leads us to a different conclusion. To "discard" is to "abandon, relinquish,
forsake."
Scott, 975 F.2d at 929 n.1 (citation omitted).
182 Scott, 975 F.2d at 929.
183 In fact, the court stated, "there is no constitutional protection from police scrutiny
as to information received from a failed attempt at secrecy." Id. at 930 (citing Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-51 (1989) (warrantless surveillance by helicopter of partially cov-
ered greenhouse held valid). See also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239
(1986) (aerial photographs from a navigable airspace held valid); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 212-15 (1986) (warrantless surveillance from a plane 1,000 feet above a yard
enclosed by a ten foot fence held valid).
184 Scott, 975 F.2d at 930.
185 Id. The court went on: "[a] t most, appellant's actions made it likely that most third
parties would decline to reconstitute the shredded remnants into a legible whole." Id.
186 Id.
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The court concluded that there was nothing in its holding incon-
sistent with the ultimate test of a legitimate expectation of privacy:
whether, if police were permitted to go unregulated, "the amount of
privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society."18 7
II
How COURTS SHoUuD APPROACH WARRANT S TRAsH
SEIZURE CASES
A. Overview
The Scott litigation underscores the Greenwood Court's failure to
adequately direct lower courts' reviews of trash search cases. Three
distinct approaches are apparent from the Scott opinions, each leading
to different results. First, even after Greenwood, the district court saw
some vitality in Katz's exclusive consideration of the defendant's pri-
vacy expectations. The district court approached the case in a man-
ner essentially consistent with the paradigmatic expectation of privacy
trash case, Krivda v. California.188 Consequently, the result was privacy
protective. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, reflecting re-
cent developments of the doctrine, relied on the two other ap-
proaches apparent in Greenwood. First, the court relied on the
knowing exposure test, under which trash that is accessible to, and
likely to be viewed by, the public is not accorded constitutional protec-
tion without regard to its location. Second, the court held that when
a defendant places his trash on the curb, he has abandoned it and has
no privacy interest to be protected. The appellate court reasoned that
abandonment had not been rejected by the Greenwood Court. Aban-
donment is implicit in the bright line reading that other courts had
given the Greenwood decision: as long as the trash is placed outside the
curtilage of the home, there are no reasonable privacy expectations.
This section will analyze how courts might use the strands of cur-
rent trash doctrine in future search cases. The analysis will consider
this doctrine in light of three factual scenarios: first, trash placed
outside the curtilage of the home, as in Greenwood; second, trash
placed inside the curtilage; and third, the facts in Scott. This analysis
will focus on the fundamental question raised by Scott can privacy be
protected under the present state of warrantless trash search
doctrine?
187 Id. (quoting United States v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 610 (1991)).
188 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
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B. Outside the Curtilage Seizures
A court confronting the same fact pattern as Greenwood, that is,
trash left at curbside and thus, outside the curtilage, 89 faces a situa-
tion with the fewest analytical problems. By simply noting the factual
similarities with Greenwood, a court may import that decision's doctri-
nal ambiguity and avoid indicating on which of the three approaches
it relies.
However, an ambitious court might follow the Court of Appeals
in Scott, and conclude that the trash had simply been abandoned: that
is, the curtilage serves as a constitutional bright line, beyond which
government officials are free to search trash. Such a holding would
be consistent with Greenwood. That Court's opinion is, at least implic-
itly, infused with property law concepts. Indeed, Greenwood's heavy re-
liance on lower federal court decisions confirms what was apparent in
the immediate post-Katz era: that property notions never really
yielded to privacy considerations in this area of search and seizure law.
Throughout the post-Katz era, reliance on abandonment was the rule
rather than the exception.
Although Justice Brennan in dissent,190 as well as subsequent
courts' 91 and commentators, 192 argued that Greenwood is consistent
with a rejection of the abandonment theory, the evidence to support
this proposition is not convincing. To be sure, the Greenwood Court
could have, as the government argued, 93 relied only on the abandon-
189 This discussion assumes that the curb is roughly coterminous with the curtilage. As
the court in Hedrick stated:
At common law, the curtilage is the area encompassing the intimate activity
associated with the sanctity of the home and the privacies of life. As a re-
sult, "[t]he protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of
families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both
physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most height-
ened." The Supreme Court has declared in numerous cases that the
boundary of the curtilage is clearly marked for most homes as the area
around the home to which the activity of home life extends.
Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986))
(citations omitted).
190 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191 See, e.g., Hedrick, 922 F.2d at 400. But see Scott 975 F.2d 927 (1992).
192 See, e.g., LAFAvE, supra note 12, § 2.6 (Supp. 1993); David W. Cunis, Note, Califor-
nia v. Greenwood: Discarding the Traditional Approach to the Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38
CATH. U. L. REv. 543 (1989).
193 In Greenwood the government argued:
Most courts have concluded that trash placed for collection outside the cur-
tilage or removed from the curtilage by the trash collector is abandoned
property... A person may well not intend to relinquish all rights in per-
sonal property but nevertheless take action rendering his intent ineffective
for Fourth Amendment purposes. The act of placing garbage for collection
is an act of abandonment.




ment theory and reached the same results. Moreover, Greenwoods au-
thor, Justice White, had rejected property law concepts explicitly in
his dissent in California v. Rooney,194 decided before Greenwood.195 Al-
ternatively, to support its view that Greenwood's privacy expectations
were objectively unreasonable, the Greenwood majority placed great
weight on federal court of appeals' decisions that overwhelmingly re-
lied on abandonment analysis. 196 Indeed, Greenwoods quotation that
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists "outside the curdlage,"197
resoundingly endorses the ancient property law concept. The curti-
lage concept signified a bright line beyond which no reasonable pri-
vacy expectations could exist.198
As applied by courts, the abandonment analysis is not privacy pro-
tective. However, privacy considerations may inform this approach,
especially by means of an invigorated intent inquiry, one of the two
prongs of common law abandonment analysis. 199 Property law recog-
nizes that the "act of abandonment" is demonstrated by a intention to
194 California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987) (per curiam) (WhiteJ., dissenting).
195 Rooney was considered during the Court's 1986 term.
196 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
197 Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 49 n.2 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198 The Greenwood Court's apparent embrace of property law concepts is also under-
scored by its prominent quotation of and reliance on United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d
397 (3d Cir. 1981). Reicherter is thoroughly an abandonment case. In Reicherter, local and
federal law enforcement authorities posed as garbage collectors and picked up defendant's
trash. The trash had been placed on a sidewalk outside a fence surrounding defendant's
property. The trash contained methamphetamine and this evidence established probable
cause for a subsequent warrant to search the defendant's house. The defendant was later
convicted on the drug charges. The court held that "the placing of trash in garbage cans at
a time and place for anticipated collection by public employees for hauling to a dump
signifies abandonment." Reicherter, 647 F.2d at 399 (quoting United States v. Shelby, 573
F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978)). The language in Reicherter on
which the Greenwood Court relies is taken from the following passage:
[having placed the trash] in an area particularly suited for public inspection and,
in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having
strangers take it, it is inconceivable that the defendant intended to retain a
privacy interest in the discarded objects. If he had such an expectation, it
was not reasonable.
Reicherter, 647 F.2d at 399 (emphasis indicates portion quoted in Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-
41 (1988)). In support of its holding, the Reicherter court cites seven cases, including the
prominent pre-Katz abandonment case, United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963). Of the six other cases, five are grounded in aban-
donment. United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied;
444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 959 (1979); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973-74 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 841 (1978); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United
States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972). For a discussion of the analysis used in
these cases, see supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
The Reicherter language is also important because it is largely the basis for the Seventh
Circuit's construction of the knowing exposure test. See supra notes 145-47 and accompa-
nying text.
199 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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relinquish all title, possession or claim to the property.200 As noted
earlier, the intent prong withered under traditional analysis. It even-
tually was subsumed by the second prong, physical abandonment, 20 1
because the court presumed an intent to abandon in the act of physi-
cal abandonment. However, if the notion of abandonment is in fact
to control the analysis, courts should not presume the waiver of a con-
stitutional right.2 0 2 Under a reinvigorated intent inquiry, a court
should closely examine the facts before it for evidence of intent to
waive. A court might, for example, reasonably conclude that an indi-
vidual intends to abandon all interest in the trash only upon its com-
mingling with other garbage.203 Or a court might view a trash
collector either as an agent of the individual or as one to whom the
individual intended to abandon the garbage.20 4
With the bright line analysis available, a court would probably
have little reason to rely exclusively on the knowing exposure test
when confronted with an outside-the-curtilage case. A court con-
cemed with privacy protection would be unlikely to find any utility in
the knowing exposure approach.
A lower federal court facing a situation involving garbage outside-
the-curtilage is unlikely to rely on a pure Katz expectation of privacy
analysis.20 5 In light of Greenwoods repudiation of Krivda, a court could
not credibly hold that an individual retained a reasonable expectation
of privacy in curbside garbage. It is on this point that much of the
post-Greenwood commentary has focused. Most analysts have con-
tended that the Court's privacy calculus was simply wrong, and that it
is objectively reasonable for an individual to retain an expectation of
privacy in trash left at the curbside for collection.20 6 Impbrtant to
many commentators is the Court's failure to make a key distinction:
while one may expect "animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and
other members of the public" to rummage through one's trash, one
would not similarly expect the police to do the same.207 Furthermore,
as the Krivda court noted, while it is reasonable to expect that third
200 Mascolo, supra note 32, at 401-02.
201 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
203 See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 458 P.2d 713, 718 (Cal. 1969).
204 See, e.g., People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (Cal. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 33
(1972); Edwards, 458 P.2d at 718.
205 State courts, however, may pursue a privacy analysis under their separate constitu-
tional provisions. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
206 For discussion of the reasonableness of trash searches, see supra notes 207-10 and
accompanying text.
207 See, e.g., Mary E. Minor, Note, Was The Right of Privay Trashed in California v. Green-
wood?, 24 TuLsA LJ. 401, 419 (1989). See also State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276-77
(Haw. 1985) ("People reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage
through their trash bags to discover their personal effects.").
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parties may come into contact with the garbage, it is unreasonable to
expect that these third parties will assist the police.20 8
Greenwood avoids the question of expectations regarding police
retrieval by concluding that it is unreasonable to expect police to avert
their eyes from evidence exposed to other members of the public.20 9
Many commentators view Greenwood as consistent with the Court's
twenty year narrowing of Fourth Amendment privacy expectations.
Some have even argued that a defendant's expectation of privacy must
be virtually absolute in order to receive Fourth Amendment
protection.2 10
In sum, Greenwood indicates that garbage placed outside the curti-
lage does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is
the basis for the bright line test used by some post-Greenwood courts.21'
However, an explicit reliance on abandonment, as in the appellate
decision in Scott, when joined with a revival of the intent prong may
increase privacy protection.
C. Inside-the-Curtilage Seizures
Greenwoods infusion of the curtilage concept into privacy analysis
reveals a critical difference between the Court's modem and tradi-
tional treatment of curtilage. Traditionally, curtilage marked constitu-
tionally protected areas, inside of which warrantless searches were
proscribed. Under Greenwood, curtilage serves as a dispositive line
outside of which courts may find no reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, individuals are not necessarily assured of any privacy protec-
tion within the curtilage.2 12 Curtilage is thus stripped of any protec-
tive function.
The modem, less privacy protective, conception of curtilage lies
at the heart of what is most troubling about contemporary trash
search jurisprudence. Although Katz did unmoor the doctrine from
the rigidities of property law in favor of a sharper focus on the Fourth
Amendment's central concem-protection of individuals from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion-the new doctrine could be applied
loosely and selectively. In the context of trash searches, courts have
rejected only some aspects of property law while continuing to rely on
other property concepts. This selective reliance on property law was
an important basis for the knowing exposure analysis.213
208 Krivda, 486 P.2d at 1269.
209 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988).
210 See, e.g., LAFAvE, supra note 12, § 2.6 (Supp. 1993); Cunis, supra note 192, at 569;
Serr, supra note 22; Taylor, supra note 27.
211 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 14849 and accompanying text.
213 Katz's rejection of property concepts displaced the curtilage's role as a constitution-
ally dispositive boundary. Accordingly, seizure of trash could take place within the [curd-
19941
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A leading post-Greenwood opinion, United States v. Hedrick,214 de-
cided by a Seventh Circuit panel and cited by both Scott decisions, 215
sanctioned inside-the-curtilage searches under the knowing exposure
approach. A court applying this approach should determine whether
the garbage is readily publicly accessible and likely to be viewed by the
public.216 If so, the court concluded, then the trash is knowingly ex-
posed for Fourth Amendment purposes. Importantly, the Hedrick
court premised its approach on the observation that, in light of Green-
wood, the continued viability of abandonment analysis is questiona-
ble.217 As a result, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, property concepts
such as curtilage, although discussed by the Greenwood Court, should
be rejected as contours for Fourth Amendment protection.218 Under
this view, trash within the curtilage-even though not abandoned-is
not necessarily subject to the owner's control, as the traditional con-
ception of curtilage would imply. In short, as articulated by the Sev-
enth Circuit, courts using the knowing exposure test should not view
curtilage as a barrier to warrantless seizure of trash.
A knowing exposure approach results in far less privacy protec-
tion than does a traditional property law analysis. Knowing exposure,
however, does share with traditional property analysis a central con-
cern with location. Both inquiries focus on whether the trash could
be deemed accessible. By its terms, however, knowing exposure only
vaguely suggests a zone in which no Fourth Amendment protection
may be expected. As the Hedrick court noted:
[W] hile the boundaries of the curtilage roughly correspond to areas
to which the public would not routinely have access, this correlation
is not complete and does not end the Fourth Amendment analy-
sis .... As a general rule, the reasonableness of the [privacy] expecta-
tions will increase as the garbage gets closer to the garage or
house. 21
9
lage] ... if the elements of the knowing exposure test of Hedrick are present: accessibility
to and likelihood of being viewed by the public.
214 922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 L.Ed.2d 113 (1991). For a discussion of the
facts in Hedrick, see supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
215 Scott 975 F.2d at 929; Scot4 776 F. Supp. at 632.
216 For further discussion on what a court should require under this approach, see infra
notes 22946 and accompanying text.
217 Hedrick 922 F.2d at 398. The Hedrick court observed that:
[I] n Greenwood, the Supreme Court chose not to rely on principles of aban-
donment in its Fourth Amendment analysis, despite the reliance on that
principle by most of the circuit courts which had considered the constitu-
tionality of garbage searches. As a result, the continued viability of an aban-
donment approach is questionable.
Id. (citation omitted).
218 Id. at 399.
219 Id. at 400.
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So defined, knowing exposure is conceptually akin to the tradi-
tional notion of "constitutionally protected areas," although with a
dramatically different effect. For garbage within the curtilage, the
modem, constitutionally significant boundary is a loosely defined
function of the garbage's accessibility and the likelihood that the pub-
lic will view it. Therefore, under the analytical rubric constructed by
the privacy protective Katz decision, seizure of trash doctrine now
stands at the point where, in at least some instances, 220 it is less protec-
tive than even traditional property law concepts.
Against the weight of the knowing exposure approach, a court
could nonetheless uphold privacy protection in an inside-the-curtilage
situation. First, depending on the facts, a court might simply define
the zone of knowing exposure narrowly in order to preclude the
search. As evident from Hedrick's description, the test lends itself to
highly subjective determinations by courts. Thus, there is considera-
ble flexibility involved in the court's analysis.
Second, the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in Scott sug-
gests another reasonable starting point for ensuring privacy under the
knowing exposure test. A court might legitimately hold that, after
Greenwood, abandonment analysis retains some vitality; that relinquish-
ing control is central to the concept of abandonment and that control
cannot be said to be relinquished while the garbage remains within
the curtilage.221
Application of a pure Katz expectation of privacy test to an inside-
the-curtilage case is, however, problematic. Scholarly opinion sus-
taining the correctness of this approach is weighty, but case law is old
and meager. Among the commentators, Professor Wayne LaFave is
particularly persuasive:
Under Katz, for the expectation of privacy to receive Fourth Amend-
ment protection, it must be one "that society is prepared to recog-
nize as 'reasonable.'" This means that the ultimate question put by
Katz is "whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by
the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional re-
straints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens
would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a
free and open society." Surely the type of police surveillance em-
ployed in Edwards [an inside-the-curtilage case], should not go un-
regulated, for a society in which all "our citizens' trash cans could
be made the subject of police inspection" for evidence of the more
220 The facts in Scott suggest the possibility that the test, properly applied, could be
used to afford more protection. However, the Court of Appeals in Scott declined to do so.
See infra notes 223-38 and accompanying text.
221 See Mascolo, supra note 32, at 400-02.
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intimate aspects of their personal life upon nothing more than a
whim is not "free and open."222
However, Greenwood's rejection of Krivda's expectation of privacy
approach and its embrace of knowing exposure renders a court's reli-
ance on a pure expectation of privacy analysis doctrinally unsound.
D. Scott Extraordinary Privacy Seeking Acts
For common cases in which garbage is placed in a container
either inside or outside the curtilage, Greenwood's use of disparate doc-
trine and its ill-defined boundaries might accommodate some degree
of privacy protection. Given Greenwood's contradictory strands as well
as the generally confused state of trash search doctrine, however, an
individual can hardly be assured of privacy. So, the question of
whether an individual can take any steps to assure privacy remains.
Can a doctrine that is at least nominally privacy protective validate
privacy-seeking acts? Using Scott as a paradigmatic case, this section
argues that under the dominant trash doctrine, a court could find a
search like that conducted in Scott unlawful.
A court facing extraordinary privacy-seeking measures, such as
shredding, would have little trouble deciding the case under a pure
Katz expectation of privacy test. Indeed, as Professor LaFave notes,
the question should not even be raised:
Nor will it do to suggest that the citizen who desires privacy as to his
trash should arrange to dispose of it in a way other than [placing it
in trash cans in the yard]. It would be a perversion of Katz to inter-
pret it as extending protection only to those who resort to extraordi-
nary means to keep information regarding their personal lives out
of the hands of the police.223
Even after Greenwood, there was a widespread view among com-
mentators that shredding would still protect privacy interests. 224 This
view undoubtedly reflects society's broad acknowledgement that
shredding is, by definition, an ultimate privacy-seeking act. Shredding
machines are ubiquitous among private business and government en-
tities (including law enforcement agencies) 22 5 that seek secrecy. Such
machines have also been at the center stage of notable political scan-
222 LAFAv, supra note 12, at 478 (citations omitted) (quoting Krivda, 486 P.2d at
1262).
223 LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 478-79.
224 See supra note 27.
225 See e.g., Rami Grunbaum, A Banner Year in the Document Shredder Industy, Bus. J.-
SACRAMENTO, Dec. 21, 1987, at 1; Jack Kramer, At Day's End, Their Work's in Shreds, WASH.
Bus.J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 1; Mary Welch, James Bond Inspires This Entrepreneur, ATLANTA Bus.
CHRON., Mar. 4, 1991, at 6A.
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dais.226 In short, use of shredding machines is entrenched in our col-
lective consciousness as an acceptable means of keeping sensitive
information private. 227
Applying a pure Katz test to Scott's shredded trash, the district
court found it objectively reasonable for the accused to expect that his
trash would remain private. Given the questionable doctrinal validity
of the Katz test,228 however, the validity of extraordinary privacy-seek-
ing acts is probably no more than theoretical under this approach.
The court of appeals in Scott rejected the district court's applica-
tion of the Katz expectation of privacy test and relied instead on both
the abandonment and knowing exposure tests. Thus, the Court's rea-
soning squarely challenges the vitality of privacy considerations in
these two dominant contemporary approaches. As with the other fact
situations discussed above, the loose and confusing boundaries of
Greenwood and modem trash search doctrine can validate Scott's pri-
vacy-seeking acts under both knowing exposure and abandonment
analyses. The remainder of this section will suggest how.
The roots of the "knowing exposure" test lie in a selective quota-
tion from the Katz opinion: "What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection."229 This quotation, combined with the Katz view
that property rules are not to be rigidly applied in the context of
Fourth Amendment questions, was the basis for the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning in Hedrick trash may be exposed to the public, and there-
fore not be protected, notwithstanding its location.23 0
226 See, e.g. Dennis Bell, Fawn Hall Recounts Retyping, Shredding, NEWVSDAY, Mar. 23, 1989,
at 15; North Said to Have Shredded Papers After Seeing Meese, ST. PETERSBURG Tsmss, June 27,
1987, at 3A.
227 Frank W. Winne & Son v. Palmer, No. 91-2239, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183 (E.D.
Pa. August 7, 1991). Aside from Scott, this is the only post-Greenwood case that has ad-
dressed shredded trash, albeit in a non-Fourth Amendment context. In Winne & Son, the
Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss a trade secret claim that had been brought
by a competitor in the rope manufacturing industry. The defendant had instructed an
employee to collect the trash that the plaintiff had put out for pickup. Although denying
the motion to dismiss, the Court noted that the plaintiff did not take reasonable precau-
tions to protect trade secrets when, as a matter of law, he had no reasonable expectations
from prying eyes. However,
the court cannot conclude [as a matter of law] that it is impossible for plain-
tiff to sustain a cause of action. For example, if it does not appear from the
complaint whether the documents placed in the trash were intact or shred-
ded and then reconstructed, or whether they were retrieved from an area
generally accessible to others or exclusively under plaintiff's ownership and
control.
Id. at *12.
228 See supra notes 101-40 and accompanying text.
229 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
230 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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What, then, constitutes knowing exposure? In the context of gar-
bage searches, Hedrick formulates the test as whether the garbage was
in such a place that it is both "accessible to the public" and "likely to
be viewed by the public."23' These considerations are, in turn, deter-
mined by the extent to which an individual sought to "keep things
hidden from the public."2 32 According to the Hedrick court, such rea-
soning is "consistent with Greenwood."233 Therefore, the critical deter-
mination is whether shredding provides a court with sufficient basis to
conclude that the individual sought to keep things hidden from the
public. A 1983 Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Kramer,2 34 relied
on in both Hedrick and Greenwood, suggests a plausible answer. In
Kramer, the court sustained an inside-the-curtilage search by holding
that "the special protection the Fourth Amendment accords people in
'their persons, houses, papers and effects' does not extend to their
discarded garbage."2 35 The court observed, however:
Of course people sometimes do not want others to see things-e.g.,
magazines, financial records, correspondence, doctor bills-that
they sometimes throw away. But people can easily prevent this by
destroying what they want to keep secret before they discard it, or by
not discarding it. Defendant could have burned or shredded [the
searched documents] before he discarded them or kept them hid-
den somewhere inside his house. The law requires that people
travelling in public take care to keep hidden things in their posses-
sion they do want others to see, and not to say things they do not
want others to overhear, and that people who want to keep secret
numbers they dial on the telephone not make their phone calls at
home.236
If the Fourth Amendment touchstone is knowing exposure, the
reasoning in Kramer must be correct when one takes affirmative steps
to keep materials hidden that reduce the accessibility and exposure of
the materials. However, as with the knowing exposure test itself, it is
not clear what steps are enough. For instance, inasmuch as the court
in Kramer upheld the seizure of closed garbage bags, the required
steps appear to be closer to actual destruction than the sealing of the
materials in a bag or container. Under Kramer, therefore, Alan Scott's
shredding was a means to keep the material hidden, successfully
231 Hedrick, 922 F.2d at 400.
232 Id. at 398.
233 Id. at 398.
234 711 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983).
235 Id. at 792.
236 Id. (citations omitted).
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thwarting accessibility by the public and reducing the likelihood that
materials would be exposed.237
However, might Scott's efforts to keep materials hidden through
shredding become meaningless by the fact that when Scott placed the
documents, in whatever form, on the curb he abandoned them? The
Scott court of appeals reached this conclusion:
The fact that the abandoned property was partially destroyed by
shredding, although constituting evidence of [Scott's] subjective de-
sire or hope that the contents be unintelligible to third parties, does
not change the fact that it is as a result of [Scott's] own actions that
the shredded evidence was placed in the public domain.238
Again, however, the fundamental elements of abandonment anal-
ysis could prove to be extremely useful for a court concerned with
maximizing an individual's freedom from government intrusion.
Properly applied, abandonment requires both intent and a physical
act. United States v. Terry, decided by the Second Circuit before Green-
wood provides an illustration.239 In Terry, the court was concerned
with the owner's failure to retain "control over or interest in" dis-
carded trash. According to the court, Terry's placement of the trash
on the sidewalk implied that he had relinquished his privacy inter-
ests240 and the trash was deemed abandoned.2 41 Usually, according to
the Terry court, an owner's interest is limited to a simple desire that
the trash be carried away.242 When one seeks to retain an interest in
237 Recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court, while sustaining a warrantless search as
lawful, acknowledged the importance of protecting individuals' expectations in the wake of
affirmative steps to keep garbage confidential:
We are sensitive to the reality that, in our complex society, some Connecti-
cut residents may legally generate garbage that reveals highly personal in-
formation. Medical information or products, financial documents and
personal letters are among those items that we think it reasonable for Con-
necticut residents to wish to maintain as confidential. We note, however,
that the record is barren with regard to any steps taken by the defendant to
secrete his garbage, such as eradicating any identifying items in the garbage
that would be necessary to link the garbage to him.
State v. Defusco, 620 A.2d 746, 753 n.19 (Conn. 1993) (citation omitted).
Justice Katz, dissenting in Defusco, wrote:
The majority suggests . . . that it is also reasonable for society to expect
citizens to take affirmative steps--such as shredding or destroying-to hide
garbage that they wish to keep private. How many of us, as Connecticut
residents, feel the need to shred or destroy personal information before
discarding it in order to protect its confidentiality? The very fact that Con-
necticut residents customarily discard highly personal and typically confi-
dential information into their garbage without first shredding or destroying
it, is a strong indication that they expect those items to remain private.
Id. at 757-58 (Katz, J., dissenting).
238 Scott 975 F.2d at 929.
239 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, United States v. Williams, 461 U.S. 931 (1983).





one's trash, for purposes of secrecy or otherwise, "he may do so by first
shredding or burning [the private papers] or by hand-delivering the
papers to a garbage-grinding machine." 243 Other courts have also
made reference to shredding.244
Under the Tery reasoning, the presence of the shredded trash in
a public place does not defeat retention of the privacy interest. Nor
should it. Abandonment requires intent; when documents are shred-
ded, the owner manifests no intent to relinquish their private nature.
In Scott, the circuit court's conception of abandonment is con-
fused. To support its holding, the court supposes that had "an errant
breeze blown shredded documents from [Scott's] desk into the street
into the open window of a passing police car, the government would
certainly have been free to seize the incriminatory evidence without a
warrant."245 It is hard to conceive how a chance breeze could lead to
the supposition that the defendant sought to relinquish control over
the documents. The court viewed the presence of garbage in a public
place as defeating privacy interests, although these interests were evi-
denced by shredding. In light of this view, one is left to wonder about
one of the court's statements: the "mere fact that [Scott] shredded his
garbage before he placed it outside his home" does not create a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. 24 6 The Court was onto the right
idea-that there are affirmative privacy-seeking steps to protect an in-
dividual's interests even under an abandonment analysis. Unfortu-
nately, the court failed to carry its reasoning to its logical conclusion.
It is hard to conceive what act, beyond "mere" shredding, would
evince an intent to retain privacy.
CONCLUSION
The paradox posed by the Scott case-how extraordinary affirma-
tive privacy-seeking acts can be deemed insufficient under a privacy-
protective doctrine-is explained by that doctrine's loose and confus-
243 Id.
244 See e.g., United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 959 (1979). The court interpreted the test with reference to the property
doctrines:
In accord with [cited] cases, our view is that, absent proof that a person has
made some special arrangement for the disposition of his garbage inviolate, he has
no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to it once he has placed it
for collection. The act of placing it for collection is an act of abandonment
and what happens to it thereafter is not within the protection of the fourth
amendment.
Id. (emphasis added); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
962 (1983); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 974 n.5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
841 (1978).
245 Scot4 975 F.2d at 929 (emphasis added).
246 Id. at 930.
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ing boundaries. With roots deep in property law, trash seizure doc-
trine, as applied by the overwhelming majority of courts, never yielded
to the central admonition in Katz v. United States to redirect Fourth
Amendment inquiries to an individual's reasonable expectations of
privacy. Following Katz, courts continued to rely heavily on property
concepts. Moreover, courts also drew selectively from the Katz opin-
ion to construct a new test, knowing exposure, that, as applied by
courts, was less privacy-protective than the traditional property law
approach.
Two decades after Katz, the Supreme Court addressed a trash
search case. Rather than drawing clear lines, Greenwood generated
more confusion by implicitly acknowledging three separate analytical
approaches in the doctrine. All three approaches are evident in the
two Scott opinions and, as this Note concludes, all three approaches
can be used to validate Scott's privacy interests. The uncertainty in
the doctrine, however, requires the conclusion that there are no clear
answers even in cases, such as Scott, in which individuals take ex-
traordinary privacy-protective measures. Therefore, notwithstanding
the principle of privacy protection underlying Katz, shredded trash
may not be private.
In an oft-cited formulation 247 of the Katz test, Professor Amster-
dam contends that the "ultimate question" with which courts are con-
fronted is a value judgment
It is whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the
police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints,
the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be
diminished by a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and
open society. That, in outright terms, is the judgment lurking un-
derneath the Supreme Court's decision in Katz, and it seems to me
the judgment that the fourth amendment inexorably requires the
Court to make.248
Value judgments necessarily defy formulaic expression or bright
line tests, although undoubtedly objective standards may present use-
ful guideposts for a decision. Assuming Professor Amsterdam is cor-
rect regarding the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, then
Katz's central thrust-directing the constitutional inquiry to the pri-
vacy expectations of people-is necessarily correct. To determine the
extent of constitutional protections by looking to the location of trash
or by assessing whether it was knowingly exposed while ignoring ex-
247 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendmen 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349
(1974). Professor Amsterdam's formulation appears in the court of appeals opinion in
Scott. 976 F.2d 927, 931 (1st Cir. 1992). See also supra notes 187 and 222 and accompany-
ing text (restating the concerns of privacy in a free and open society).
248 Amsterdam, supra note 247, at 403.
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traordinary privacy-securing measures falls short of the inquiry de-
manded by the Fourth Amendment.
Even if the analytical approach in a case like Scott is inconsistent
with the admonitions of Katz, the result implicitly reflects a value judg-
ment on the part of courts about freedom from government intrusion
in our society.2 49 Stripped of its doctrinal technicalities, United States
v. Scott ultimately stands for the proposition that extraordinary meas-
ures will not secure Americans from intrusions by their government.
It is simply implausible to contend that this proposition is consistent
with the aims of a free and open society.
Katz attempted to clear away the doctrinal underbrush that had
obscured the central tenets of the Fourth Amendment. In the context
of trash searches, this underbrush is back in the form of bright line
and knowing exposure tests. Although these tests can be applied to
achieve privacy-protective results,250 courts would do far better to rec-
ognize that these tests shroud what the Supreme Court has identified
as the touchstone principle in determining questions involving indi-
vidual freedoms in our society.
Gordonj MacDonaldt
249 In fact, the court of appeals in Scott addressed this point squarely.
The ultimate question in this respect is "whether, if the particular form of
[conduct] practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by consti-
tutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citi-
zens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free
and open society." For the reasons stated, and, we believe, following the strictures
of Greenwood, such dangers are not found in the present case.
Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 930-31 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
250 See supra Part III.
t I thank Wendy Stone for her assistance, support and encouragement. I also thank
Professor Tracey Maclin for helpful comments and the members of the Cornell Law Review
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